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THE VULNERABILITY OF
INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS IN
AUSTRALIA AND CANADA©
BY KENT MCNEIL"
Not until the 1990s did the highest courts in
Australia and Canada begin to address the colonial
reality of the dispossession of the Indigenous peoples. In
Australia, the High Court has held that the taking of
Indigenous lands and creation of third party rights by the
Crown resulted in extinguishment of Native title. In
Canada, while not dealing directly with the issue of
extinguishment, the Supreme Court has authorized
infringement of Aboriginal land rights for a variety of
purposes, including the creation of third party rights.
This article examines the legal justifications for these
conclusions and finds that they are not consistent with
long-standing principles and precedents of the common
law. The explanations for these judicial opinions, the
author argues, can be found instead in economic and
political considerations that have been influencing the
courts. He suggests that this is a reality Indigenous
peoples need to take into account when deciding
whether to expose their rights to the judicial authority of
the Australian and Canadian states.
II a fallu attendre les ann6es 1990 pour que les plus
hautes instances juridiques de I'Australie et du Canada
commencent A s'occuper d'une r~alit6 coloniale, celle du
d6pouillement des peuples autochtones. En Australie, la
High Court a statu6 que I'appropriation des terres
autochtones et l'tablissement de droits en faveur de
tiers, par [a Couronne britannique, avaient entrain6 la
prescription du droit de propri6t6 des natifs. Au Canada,
sans traiter directement le problme de [a prescription,
la Cour Supr~me a autoris6 la transgression des droits
des aborigines sur les terres, dans le cadre d'une
diversit6 d'objectifs, comme l'6tablissement de droits en
faveur de tiers. Cet article examine les justifications
juridiques de ces conclusions, et constate qu'elles ne sont
pas coh6rentes avec les principes et pr6c6dents de la
common law, 6tablis de longue date. Les explications de
ces opinions judiciaires, selon l'auteur, se trouvent plut6t
dans les considerations 6conomiques et politiques qui
ont influenc6 les tribunaux. II sugg~re qu'il existe une
r6alit6, dont les peuples autochtones doivent tenir
compte, avant de ddcider s'ils vont soumettre leurs droits
aujugement de I'autorit6juridique de l'tat australien et
de I'ttat canadien.
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Land has figured prominently in the histories of interaction
between Indigenous peoples and European settlers in Australia and
Canada. Despite significant differences in the treatment of Indigenous
peoples in each country, the histories of both have been marked by the
disempowerment and dispossession of those peoples as the British Crown
imposed its political authority and distributed Indigenous lands to incoming
settlers. In some parts of Canada, a degree of Indigenous consent was
obtained in the form of treaties. In other places, including all of Australia
and most of British Columbia, no consent was obtained and no
compensation was paid. Nor, until recently, were the Indigenous peoples
in a position to seek redress from the courts for the loss of their lands. As
a result, pressing issues of Indigenous land rights have been left unresolved
in both nations.
Recent cases involving Indigenous land rights have forced the High
Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada to confront, however
reluctantly, the colonial reality of European settlement. This article will
focus on an important consequence of the settlement process, namely the
impairment of Indigenous land rights through the creation of third party
interests by Crown grant. My starting points will be the High Court of
Australia's decision in Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2]' and the Supreme Court
of Canada's decision in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. In Mabo, the High
Court dealt with the issue of extinguishment of Indigenous land rights by
creating an exception to the standard protection against Crown grant accorded
to property rights by the common law. In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court
was less forthcoming in this respect, limiting its discussion of extinguishment
to the context of the constitutional division of powers between the federal and
provincial governments and its treatment of apparently less-intrusive
infringement to the period following constitutional recognition of Aboriginal
rights in 1982.? Despite these differences, and the obvious historical and
constitutional disparities between Australia and Canada, the decisions in
'(1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 [Mabo].
2 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw]. Also relevant is the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision
in Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 56 [Chippewas of Sarnia]
(leave to appeal refused 8 November 2001, motion to reconsider refusal of leave dismissed 13 June
2002: [2002] 3 C.N.L.R. iv (S.C.C.)), but given that space is limited in this article, I have chosen to
discuss only High Court and Supreme Court decisions. For critical commentary on the Chippewas of
Sarnia decision, see James I. Reynolds, "Aboriginal Title: The Chippewas of Sarnia" (2002) 81 Can. Bar
Rev. 97; Kent McNeil, "Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and
Judicial Discretion" (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L. Rev. 301. Compare Paul M. Perell & Jeff G. Cowan, "In
Defence of Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General)", Case Comment (2002) 81 Can.
Bar Rev. 727.
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.ll.
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Mabo and Delgamuukw share a common theme: the vulnerability of
Indigenous land rights to the creation of third party interests by the Crown.
This article will analyze this aspect of the decisions, and suggest that the
explicit explanations for this vulnerability given by the High Court and
Supreme Court do not tell the whole story. Lurking behind the decisions, in
my opinion, are other explanations that relate more to political stability and
economic priorities than to legal principle and precedent.
I. MABO AND SUBSEQUENT HIGH COURT DECISIONS
The Mabo decision is, of course, a landmark in Australian law. After
over two hundred years of denial of Indigenous land rights by governments
and judges,4 the High Court boldly and courageously held that this denial had
been based upon erroneous application of the common law. Contrary to the
prevalent colonial attitude up to 1992, a majority of the Court decided that
after the acquisition of British sovereignty the Indigenous peoples continued
to have what is known in Australia as native title to any lands they had a
connection with under their traditional laws and customs.5 This aspect of the
decision is well-supported by legal principle, as well as by common law
precedents in other jurisdictions that were colonized by Britain, especially
Canada, New Zealand, and the eastern United States.6 In effect, the High
See Heather McRae et al., Indigenous Legal Issues: Commentary and Materials, 3rd ed. (Pyrmont,
N.S.W.: Lawbook, 2003) at 17-59, 232-37. Government denial is evidenced, for example, by the failure
of the Crown to sign treaties. See, however, Henry Reynolds, Fate of a Free People (Ringwood, Vic.:
Penguin Books, 1995), suggesting that a treaty may have been entered into with Indigenous peoples in
Tasmania. The most direct judicial denial can be found in Blackburn J.'s decision in Milirrpum v.
Nabalco Pty. (1971), 17 F.L.R. 141 (N.T.S.C.). For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, "A Question
of Title: Has the Common Law Been Misapplied to Dispossess the Aboriginals?" (1990) 16 Monash
U.L. Rev. 91.
5 Brennan J. (Mason C.J. and McHugh J. concurring), Deane and Gaudron JJ., and Toohey J.
wrote separate judgments, all arriving at this conclusion. Dawson J. dissented. As Brennan J.'s decision
expressed the majority position on extinguishment, it will be the focus of the present discussion. For
analysis of Deane and Gaudron JJ.'s and Toohey J.'s positions on extinguishment, see Kent McNeil,
"Racial Discrimination and Unilateral Extinguishment of Native Title" (1996) 1 A.I.L.R. 181 ["Racial
Discrimination"], reprinted in Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada
andAustralia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) 357 [EmergingJustice?].
On the role of traditional laws and customs, see "The Relevance of Traditional Laws and Customs to
the Existence and Content of Native Title at Common Law" in Emerging Justice? 416. Recently, the
High Court has also held that native title can be lost through failure to preserve the requisite connection
with the land through maintenance of the traditional laws and customs on which that title is based. See
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria (2002), 194 A.L.R. 538. As this means of losing native title
is distinct from extinguishment by Crown grant, it will not be discussed in this article.
6 See Garth Nettheim, "Judicial Revolution or Cautious Correction? Mabo v Queensland" (1993)
16 U.N.S.W.L.J. 1; Paul McHugh, The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1991), esp. at 83-143; and Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal
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Court's decision brought Australian law more or less into line with the rest of
the common law world in this respect.
However, there is a vital aspect of the Mabo decision that cannot be
readily justified on the basis of legal principle and precedent, namely the
judges' views on extinguishment of native title. The Court held that, prior to
the enactment of the RacialDiscrimination Act 1975 (Cth.), native title would
have been extinguished to the extent that it was inconsistent with either a real
property interest granted by the Crown or appropriation and use of the land
by the Crown.7 Justice Brennan (as he then was) provided a broad
justification for this:
Sovereignty carries the power to create and to extinguish private rights and interests in land
within the Sovereign's territory. It follows that, on a change of sovereignty, rights and interests
in land that may have been indefeasible under the old regime become liable to extinction by
exercise of the new sovereign power.8
But as Justice Brennan went on to acknowledge, "under the constitutional law
of [Australia], the legality (and hence the validity) of an exercise of sovereign
power depends on the authorityvested in the organ of government purporting
to exercise it."9
The nub of the problem is this: in English and hence Australian
constitutional law, the Crown in its executive capacity cannot infringe or take
away vested rights, especially rights in relation to land, without unequivocal
statutory authority."t This is a fundamental principle, going back at least to
Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Compare S.E.K. Hulme, "Aspects of the High Court's Handling
of Mabo" (1993) No. 87 Victoria Bar News 29, responded to by Ron Castan & Bryan Keon-Cohen,
"Mabo and the High Court: A Reply to S.E.K. Hulme, Q.C." (ibid. at 47).
7 See Mabo, supra note 1, esp. at 63-70, Brennan J. However, in the absence of clear statutory
authority to the contrary, Deane, Gaudron and Toohey JJ., dissenting on this issue, were of the view
that the Crown grant or appropriation would be wrongful, and therefore would result in a claim for
compensation (see ibid. at 15, Mason C.J. & McHugh J.). For discussion of appropriation by the Crown
and compensation, neither of which will be dealt with in this article, see "Racial Discrimination", supra
note 5.
8 Mabo, supra note 1 at 63 [footnote omitted]. Brennan J. relied solely on American authority for
this. This is remarkable because American law does not in fact support his position on extinguishment.
See Kent McNeil, "Extinguishment of Native Title: The High Court and American Law" (1997) 2
A.I.L.R. 365, reprinted in Emerging Justice?, supra note 5 at 409.
9 Mabo, supra note 1 at 63.
See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 21st ed. (London: Sweet,
Maxwell and Steves & Norton, 1844) vol. 1 at 127-29, 138-45; Herbert Broom, Constitutional Law
Viewed in Relation to Common Law, 2d ed. by George L. Denman (London: W. Maxwell and Son, 1885)
at 225-45; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., vol. 8 (London: Butterworths, 1974) at paras. 828, 833;
Australian Communist Party v. The Commonwealth (1951), 83 C.L.R. 1 at 230-31 (H.C.), Williams J.; and
Clunies-Ross v. The Commonwealth (1984), 155 C.L.R. 193 at 201 (H.C.).
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Magna Carta,"t that was firmly entrenched in the sometimes bloody struggle
between the Stuart kings and Parliament in the 17th century. It lies at the
heart of both the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty.
1 2
Justice Brennan was obviously aware of the need for the Crown to
have statutory authority to extinguish native title executively by grant. He said
that in Queensland, where the Mabo case arose, "the Crown's power to grant
an interest in land is, by force of ss. 30 and 40 of the Constitution Act 1867
(Q.), an exclusively statutory power and the validity of a particular grant
depends upon conformity with the relevant statute., 13 However, this raises the
question of how the Crown could have extinguished native title by grantprior
to receiving this statutory authority, which was first conferred on it in Australia
in 1842.14 Moreover, in the absence of clear and plain legislative intent to the
contrary, statutory authority to grant lands would not allow the Crown to
infringe or extinguish existing land rights. This is because a well-established
principle of statutory interpretation requires legislation to be construed, if at
all possible, in favour of vested rights and against authorizing executive
interference with them, as it is presumed that legislatures do not intend to
interfere with vested rights. 5 Justice Brennan seems to have acknowledged
this as well, but he tried to avoid its implications by saying that the
presumption only applies to prevent "impairment of an interest in land
granted by the Crown or dependent on a Crown grant." 6 He accordingly
concluded that, "as native title is not granted by the Crown, there is no
comparable presumption affecting the conferring of any executive power on
In Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd., [19201 A.C. 508 at 569 (H.L.) [De Keyser's
Royal Hotel], Lord Parmoor said: "Since Magna Carta the estate of a subject in lands or buildings has
been protected against the prerogative of the Crown."
12 See The Proclamations Case (1610), 12 Co. Rep. 74 (K.B.); Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 St.
Tr. 1030 (C.P.); Broom, supra note 10 at 245, 386-88; and A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the
Law of the Constitution, 9th ed. (London: MacMillan and Co., 1939) at 50-54.
13 Mabo, supra note 1 at 63 [footnote omitted].
14 In New South Wales, which until 1859 included the territory that then became the separate
colony of Queensland, grants of land were originally made under the royal prerogative. Statutory
authority for the Crown to grant lands was provided by the Sale of Waste Lands Act, 1842 (U.K.), 5 &
6 Vict., c.36. See Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996), 141 A.L.R. 129 at 171-72, Toohey J. [W/k]; Enid
Campbell, "Crown Land Grants: Form and Validity" (1966) 40 A.L.J. 35.
15 See Newcastle Breweries, Limited v. The King, [1920] 1 K.B. 854 at 866 (K.B.), Salter J.;Attorney-
Generalfor Canada v. Hallet & Carey Ld., [1952] A.C. 427 at 450 (P.C.), Lord Radcliffe [Hallet]; D.C.
Pearce & R.S. Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 3rd ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1988) at 106-
07; and Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994)
at 370-76. For recent acknowledgement that this principle applies to native title, see Wilson v. Anderson
(2002), 190 A.L.R. 313, esp. at 348-49 (H.C.A.), Kirby J., dissenting [Anderson].
16 Mabo, supra note 1 at 64.
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the Crown the exercise of which is apt to extinguish native title., 17
With all due respect for Justice Brennan, there is no justification in
legal principle or precedent to deny native title protection from executive
action simply because that title is not derived from Crown grant. 8 On the
contrary, the principle that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as not
to authorize executive interference is of general application-it is not limited
to protecting property rights that originate from the Crown.' That a Crown
grant does not confer some special protection should be evident to anyone
familiar with English legal history, as it is a well-known fact that most land
titles in England were not derived from Crown grant.20 It is therefore not
surprising that the protection accorded to real property rights by the common
law has never depended on their source.2' This is evident as well in situations
where titles originating from adverse possession are concerned, as those titles
are no more vulnerable to executive interference than titles that originate from
Crown grant.22
Justice Brennan nonetheless held that, for native title to be
extinguished by either legislative or executive action, the intention for that to
171Ibid 
.
18 For more detailed discussion, see "Racial Discrimination", supra note 5, esp. at 192-98
(Emerging Justice? at 370-79).
19 See, e.g. Hallet, supra note 15, where the Privy Council accepted that this principle applied in
the context of executive taking of oats and barley, title to which obviously would not have been derived
from Crown grant. At 450, Lord Radcliffe stated the principle in broad terms: "there is a well-known
principle that statutes which encroach upon the rights of the subject, whether as regards person or
property, are subject to a 'strict' construction." See also The Queen v. Colet, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 2 at 10. For
further authority that the protection is not limited to property rights derived from the Crown, see
"Racial Discrimination", supra note 5 at 193-94 (Emerging Justice? at 372-74).
20 See Blackstone, supra note 10, vol. 2 at 51-52; Charles Yorke, Considerations on the Law of
Forfeitures, for High Treason, 4th ed. (London: J. Williams, 1775) at 64-65; Attorney-General v. Brown
(1847), 1 Legge 312 at 318 (N.S.W.S.C.); Doe d. Wilson v. Terry (1849), 1 Legge 505 at 508-09
(N.S.W.S.C.); and Attorney-General of Ontario v. Mercer (1883), 8 App. Cas. 767 at 771-72 (P.C.).
21In Attorney-General for the Isle of Man v. Mylchreest (1879), 4 App. Cas. 294 (P.C.), customary
land rights prevailed against a Crown grant. For further authority and discussion, see "Racial
Discrimination", supra note 5 at 192-97 (Emerging Justice? at 372-78).
22 In Peny v. Clissold, [1907] A.C. 73, the Privy Council affirmed a decision of the High Court of
Australia that the Crown had to pay compensation to an adverse possessor when it expropriated the
land he possessed, even though he did not yet have a valid title as against the person who had been
dispossessed because the statutory limitation period had not run out. For instances where title was
acquired against the Crown by adverse possession, see Attorney-Generalfor British Honduras v. Bristowe
(1880), 6 App. Cas. 143 (P.C.); Attorney-Generalfor New South Wales v. Love, [1898] A.C. 679 (P.C.).
Moreover, even when good title is obtained at the end of the limitation period, it is derived from
possession, not from the statute, the effect of which is simply to extinguish other claims. See Tichborne
v. Weir (1892), 67 L.T. 735 (C.A.); Fairweather v. St. Matylebone Property, [1963] A.C. 510, esp. at 535
(H.L.).
276
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occur had to be clear and plain. 23 He did not find such an intention in the
statutory law of Queensland relating to land.24 However, he apparently
concluded that the necessary intent could be found in Crown grants of
interests that were inconsistent with native title. But as the common law does
not allow the Crown to infringe or extinguish vested rights, authority for the
Crown to do so must be clearly and plainly provided by statute. What is
missing from Justice Brennan's judgment is identification of the statutory
provisions that clearly and plainly empowered the Crown to infringe or
extinguish native title by grant.25
The extinguishment-by-grant aspect of the Mabo decision has
nonetheless been followed in subsequent cases, with the same lack of attention
to and respect for fundamental legal principles and precedents. As in Mabo,
the High Court has generally failed to identify the source of the Crown's
authority to infringe or extinguish native title. In Western Australia v. The
Commonwealth,' Chief Justice Mason and Justices Brennan, Deane, Toohey,
Gaudron, and McHugh in their joint judgment said that, to the extent that a
land title granted by the Crown "consists in ownership of or a legal or
equitable interest in land, it cannot be extinguished without statutory
authority."' However, they went on to rely on Justice Brennan's judgment in
Mabo for the proposition that, "[alt common law, ... native title can be
extinguished or impaired by a valid exercise of sovereign power inconsistent
with the continued enjoyment or unimpaired enjoyment of native title."8 As
23 Mabo, supra note 1 at 64. The same rule applies in Canada. See R v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R.
1075 at 1099 [Sparrow]; Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1120, Lamer C.J.C.
2 4 Mabo, supra note 1 at 64-68.
25 Brennan J. apparently thought that native title land was included in the definition of "Crown
land" in s. 4 of the LandAct 1910 (Qld.): ibid. at 65-66. He admitted, however, that this definition was
no doubt based on the mistaken belief that "the absolute ownership of all land in Queensland is vested
in the Crown until it is alienated by Crown grant": ibid. at 66. Moreover, as a general rule the Crown,
like anyone else, cannot give what it does not have (this is the familiar nemo dat rule). See The Case of
Alton Woods (1600), 1 Co. Rep. 40b at 43b-46b (K.B.); Bristow v. Cormican (1878), 3 App. Cas. 641
(H.L.); and Herbert Broom,A Selection ofLegalMaxims, 8th ed. by Joseph Gerald Pearce & Herbert
Chitty (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1911) at 41 ("The Crown cannot dispense with anything in which
the subject has an interest, nor make a grant in violation of the common law, or injurious to vested
rights" [footnotes omitted]). So even if, as Brennan J. apparently concluded, the Queensland legislature
inadvertently included native title lands in the definition of "Crown lands" (this is highly debatable: see
discussion of an analogous statute in text accompanying notes 36-46), surely the legislators could not
have intended thereby-and certainly could not have clearly and plainly intended-to exclude the
application of the nemo dat rule in this context. If not invalid, Crown grants therefore should have been
subject to native title, not vice versa.
26 (1995), 128 A.L.R. 1 [Western Australia].
2 7 Ibid. at 25, citing Brennan J.'s judgment in Mabo, supra note 1 at 64.
28 Western Australia, supra note 26 at 25 [emphasis added].
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a justification for this, they simply reiterated Justice Brennan's view in Mabo
that, because native title does not originate from Crown grant, it is not
protected by the rule that "a [Crown] grant cannot be superseded by a
subsequent inconsistent grant made to another person. ' '29 No statutory
authority empowering the Crown to infringe or extinguish native title was
referred to in this context, as the Court apparently thought such authority to
be unnecessary because the source of native title places it outside the
protection that the common law accords to land titles that originate from
Crown grant. As we have seen, this is inconsistent with well-established
common law principles and precedents.
In WikPeoples v. Queensland,' the High Court dealt with the question
of whether Crown grants of pastoral leases necessarily extinguished native
title. The majority decided that extinguishment need not have occurred,3' as
the pastoral leases in question did not create rights of exclusive possession,
and so they could co-exist with at least some native title rights.32 The majority
nonetheless held, on the basis of Mabo, that the leases prevailed insofar as
they were inconsistent with native title, leaving open the important issue of
whether native title would be partially extinguished or merely suspended to
the extent of any inconsistency.3 3 But while the judges in Wik were able to rely
on statute for the Crown's authority to grant pastoral leases, 34 they failed to
identify a clear and plain legislative intention for this power to be exercised so
as to infringe existing legal rights, including native title rights. In this respect,
the decision suffers from the same lack of respect for the fundamental
principle that the Crown cannot infringe or extinguish vested rights without
unequivocal statutory authority.
The High Court nonetheless applied the extinguishment-by-grant
doctrine derived from Mabo in Fejo v. Northern Territory.35 Fejo involved a
29 Ibid.
30 Wik, supra note 14.
31 Toohey, Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ. wrote separate judgments arriving at the same result.
32 For discussion, see Kent McNeil, "Co-Existence of Indigenous Rights and Other Interests in
Land in Australia and Canada" [1997] 3 C.N.L.R. 1.
33Wik, supra note 14, esp. at 182-90, Toohey J. Moreover, the majority did not accept Brennan
J.'s suggestion in Mabo, supra note 1 at 68, that leases generally would extinguish rather than suspend
native title. Brennan C.J. (as he had become), Dawson and McHugh JJ. concurring, dissented in Wik
because he was of the view that the pastoral leases did confer a right of exclusive possession which
extinguished native title.
34 Pastoral leases in Australia are entirely statutory, as they have no common law counterpart. In
Queensland, the statutory authority to grant the leases in question was provided by the Land Act 1910
(Qld.) and the Land Act 1962 (Qld.).
35 (1998), 195 C.L.R. 96 [Fejo].
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native title claim to land south of Darwin that had been granted in fee simple
in 1882 and later compulsorily acquired by the Crown for a quarantine station.
The High Court held unanimously that the Crown grant had completely
extinguished native title to the land, and consequently the title was not revived
when the Crown acquired the land in 1927.
The grant of the fee simple interest in Fejo had been made under the
authority of a South Australia statute, the Northern Territory LandAct, 1872.-6
Section 8 of that Act provided:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Governor, in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty,
may grant in fee simple, or for any less estate or interest, to the purchaser thereof, any waste
lands, which grants shall be in such forms as shall from time to time be deemed expedient by the
Governor in Council....
The term "waste lands" was defined in section 2:
All lands in the Northern Territory vested in Her Majesty which have not been or may not
hereafter be reserved for, or dedicated to any public purpose, or which have not been granted
or lawfully contracted to be granted to any person in fee-simple; and all lands which at the time
of the coming into operation of this Act may have become, and which thereafter may become
forfeited by reason of any breach in the conditions on which the same have been granted or
leased, or contracted to be granted or leased[.]
Chief Justice Gleeson and Justices Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow,
Hayne, and Callinan, in their joint judgment in Fejo (Justice Kirby wrote a
separate concurring judgment), said this about the Crown's statutory
authority: "The power to deal with waste lands in the Northern Territory
(which included the land granted [in 1882]) was to be found wholly within the
1872 Act. ... That Act permitted the making of an unqualified grant of an
estate in fee simple."37 What is remarkable about this aspect of the decision
is that the judges made no reference to the definition of "waste lands" in the
NTLA, and so offered no explanation of why lands subject to native title would
come within that definition. They simply stated that the granted lands had
been waste lands, and so were subject to the Crown's statutory power to create
a fee simple interest.
Going through the analysis that the High Court conveniently avoided,
we need to start with the definition itself: "waste lands" were "[aill lands in the
Northern Territory vested in Her Majesty," with the stated exceptions.38 The
definition therefore assumed that there were ungranted Crown lands in the
36 S.A., No. 28 of 1872 [NTLA]. At the time, the Northern Territory was administered by the colony
of South Australia.
3 7 Supra note 35 at 129.
38 NTLA, supra note 36, s.2.
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Northern Territory, the disposition of which would henceforth be regulated
by the NTLA. No doubt it was also assumed, as was the case when the LandAct
1910 was enacted in Queensland, that the Indigenous peoples in Australia did
not have title to their traditional lands.39 But as a result of Mabo, we now know
that the second assumption, at least, was wrong. Moreover, native title can
amount to a right "as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use
and enjoyment" of land, as was declared in Mabo.40 At least where that kind
of native title is involved, the Crown's title to the land is limited to what has
been called an underlying or radical title that is equivalent to the title the
Crown has as lord paramount over lands in England.41
Freehold lands in England that are held by private persons, whether
as a result of long-standing undisputed title, adverse possession for the
statutory limitation period, or Crown grant, are not regarded as Crown lands,
whether waste or otherwise.42 This is because the Crown does not have a
present beneficial interest in those lands; instead, it has a lordship over them,
an incorporeal thing which, in Maitland's memorable words, is "quite distinct
from the land over which it hovers. 43 Similarly, lands that are subject to a
native title amounting to the kind of exclusive interest that the Court found to
exist in Mabo are not Crown lands, in the sense that those words are
commonly used. So to treat them as "lands ... vested in Her Majesty" and thus
bring them within the definition of "waste lands" in the NTLA is to
misunderstand the nature of the Crown's underlying or radical title to those
lands. What the Crown has in this context is the equivalent of a lordship
which, as Maitland has told us, is an incorporeal thing that the common law
classified as "land," but it is not the physical land itself. As lands subject to
native title therefore should not be encompassed by the definition of "waste
lands" in the NTLA, the statute could not have authorized the Crown to grant
interests in native title lands. The 1882 grant of a fee simple that was made
under the purported authority of the statute therefore should have been
invalid.'
See supra note 25.
40 Supra note 1 at 217.
41 Ibid., esp. at 48, Brennan J.
42 See McNeil, supra note 6 at 79-93.
43 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of
Edward I, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898) vol. 2 at 3-4.
44 Alternatively, even if the NTLA, supra note 36, did authorize the Crown to grant an interest in
lands that were subject to an exclusive native title, the existence of that title should have prevented the
grantee from obtaining a present possessory interest because the Crown did not have such an interest
to give. This is due to the nemo dat rule. See supra note 25.
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My conclusion that the NTLA did not authorize the Crown to grant
lands that were subject to native title is supported by principles of statutory
interpretation as well. We have already seen that the suggestion inMabo and
Western Australia that the common law permitted the Crown to infringe or
extinguish native title by grant is inconsistent with well-established legal
principle and precedent. But if the authority to do this is statutory, as was held
in Fejo, then the statute should meet the requirement of clear and plain
legislative intent to give the Crown the power to infringe or extinguish vested
rights. 45 To try to derive such authority from a definition section of the NTLA
that was no doubt intended to clarify what lands of the Crown could be granted
under authority of the Act requires stretching principles of statutory
interpretation to the breaking point. 6
In my opinion, the High Court's failure in Fejo to even address the
issue of how a statute can implicitly authorize extinguishment of vested land
rights through a definition section is symptomatic of the weakness of the
Court's analysis of the whole extinguishment issue. If anything, Fejo represents
an even more disturbing abdication ofjudicial responsibility than Mabo in this
respect, because in Mabo, Justice Brennan at least attempted to offer some
explanation, however weak, for the power of the Crown to extinguish native
title by grant. This judicial failure to adequately explain the Court's position
on such a fundamental issue suggests to me that the real reasons behind the
position are not legal at all-they are political and economic. 7 We will come
back to this point in the final part of this article, after examining how the
Supreme Court of Canada has so far dealt with the issue of infringement of
Aboriginal title.
The High Court revisited the extinguishment issue in its recent
decision in Western Australia v. Ward,8 which involved an application to the
Federal Court for a determination of native title in the East Kimberley region
in Western Australia and the Northern Territory. In Ward, the High Court
deftly attempted to avoid the problems revealed in its earlier pronouncements
45 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
46
Besides the principle that statutes should not be interpreted as authorizing interference with
vested rights unless the intention to confer that authority is unequivocal, there is "the valuable rule
never to enact under the guise of definition": S.G.G. Edgar, Craies on Statute Law, 7th ed. (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1971) at 213.
47 See "Racial Discrimination", supra note 5 at 219-20 (Emerging Justice? at 406-7); McNeil, supra
note 8 at 369-70 (Emerging Justice? at 415).
(2002), 191 A.L.R. 1 [Ward].
2004]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 42, NO. 2
on the issue by relying on the Native Title Act 199349 and State and Territory
legislation authorized by that Act. In their majority judgment, Chief Justice
Gleeson and Justices Gaudron, Gummow, and Hayne (hereinafter referred
to as the majority) said that the NTA lay "at the core of this litigation[,]" unlike
in Mabo, Wik, and Fejo.50 Accordingly, they emphasized that "... it is to the
terms of the NTA that primary regard must be had, and not the decisions in
Mabo [No 2] or Wik. The only present relevance of those decisions is for
whatever light they cast on the NTA."5 t This attempt to rely on the legislation
tends to distort the analysis, in particular because it masks the fact that some
of the NTA's key provisions relating to extinguishment cannot be applied
without resorting to the common law, as expressed in those earlier decisions.
Admittedly, the NTA provides in s. 11 (1) that "[niative title is not able
to be extinguished contrary to this Act. 52 The 1998 amendments confirmed
that Crown grants made by the Commonwealth extinguished native title if they
were valid and were "previous exclusive possession acts," as defined by the
amendments.53 But for those grants to be valid when issued, the Crown would
have had to have the authority to make them, which, as we have seen, was the
very issue the Court failed to address adequately in its earlier decisions on
native title 4 The amendments also provide that a valid Commonwealth grant
49 (Cth.) [NTA], as am. by Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth.). For detailed discussion of the
amendments and their effect, see Richard H. Bartlett, Native Title in Australia, 2nd ed. (Chatswood,
N.S.W.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004).
50 Ward, supra note 48 at 12. Kirby J. wrote a judgment concurring in result, but nonetheless
differing from the majority on some issues relating to the content of native title and extinguishment.
Callinan J. wrote a lengthy dissent, in which he took a harder line on extinguishment than the majority
(e.g., he distinguished Wik, supra note 14, and expressed the view that pastoral leases in Western
Australia and the Northern Territory extinguished native title completely). McHugh J. agreed with
Callinan J.'s conclusions, as well as with his reasons (with one exception: see Ward, ibid. at 135, 156).
51Ward, ibid. at 19. Compare Kirby 's judgment at 164 ("the test for extinguishment must begin
with the NTA, although, as that Act itself provides, the common law retains a role"). See also Callinan
J.'s dissenting opinion at 179-182, 195 ("Because so much of the language of the Native Title Act has
its genesis in the judgment of Brennan J in Mabo [No 2], resort to that case continues to be useful and,
indeed, necessary").
5 2 Supra note 49.
Ibid., ss. 23B, 23C. Note, however, that some of the grants defined as previous exclusive
possession acts in s.23B might not have conferred exclusive possession on their own, in which case they
would not have extinguished native title without the 1998 amendments to the NTA. Note also that s.23E
provides that a law of a State or Territory can likewise confirm extinguishment by grants of exclusive
possession interests made by the State or Territory on or before December 23, 1996. For application
of these provisions in New South Wales, see Anderson, supra note 15, decided the same day as Ward,
supra note 48.
54See supra notes 7-47 and accompanying text. In Ward, supra note 48, the majority appears to
have thought that the issue of validity in this context depended, at least in part, on whether the grant
had been made before or after the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.) [RDA] came into force. See
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of a non-exclusive agricultural or pastoral lease made on or before December
23,1996, extinguishes native title rights and interests to the extent that they are
inconsistent with the rights and interests of the grantee "if, apart from thisAct,
the act [grant] extinguishes the native title rights and interests"; otherwise, the
native title rights and interests are merely suspended for the duration of the
lease.5 5 Clearly, this must mean that the grant of a non-exclusive agricultural
or pastoral lease, if valid, could result in partial extinguishment of native title
only if that would have occurred apart from the NTA, which once again takes
us back to the common law and earlier legislation.' Moreover, this
interpretation was confirmed in Ward, where the majority said that the valid
grant of non-exclusive pastoral leases by the State of Western Australia
involved
the grant of rights and interests inconsistent with so much of the native title rights and interests
as stipulated for control of access to the land the subject of the grants. The pastoral leases were
Ward at 68, where the majority said in reference to the pastoral leases under consideration that "[t]hey
were granted before the RDA commenced and there is, therefore, no question about their validity." See
also Anderson, supra note 15 at 328, where Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. added that an act could
be valid within the meaning of this subsection if it was a "past act" made after the commencement of
the RDA that had been validated by the NTA or corresponding State legislation.
55 5NTA, supra note 49, s.23G(1)(b) [emphasis added] (for apparent disapproval of the distinction
this subsection makes between extinguishment and suspension, see Ward, supra note 48 at 281 n.1062,
Callinan J., dissenting). S.231 provides that a law of a State or Territory can give the same effect to non-
exclusive agricultural or pastoral leases granted by the State or Territory.
56 See Bartlett, supra note 49 at ( 17.5]. The NTA, supra note 49, s.23A(3) nonetheless provides: "If
the acts were 'previous non-exclusive possession acts' (involving grants of non-exclusive agricultural
leases or non-exclusive pastoral leases), they will have extinguished native title to the extent of any
inconsistency." Taken alone, this subsection suggests that the 1998 amendments were intended to bring
about partial extinguishment of native title by non-exclusive agricultural and pastoral leases. However,
s.23A is just a summary of Div. 2B of the Act that was drafted before s.23G was rewritten (as part of
a compromise reached with Senator Brian Harradine in exchange for his support of the Bill amending
the Act) and the words "apart from this Act" were added. Compare s.23G of the NTA with the version
of that section in the Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth.) (note also that the original wording of the
heading to s.23G, "Confirmation of partial extinguishment of native title by previous non-exclusive
possession acts of Commonwealth," was retained, possibly adding to the confusion, despite the fact that
the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth.), s.13(3), provides that "no heading to a section of an Act, shall
be taken to be part of the Act"). When ss. 23A and 23G, as enacted, are read together, it is apparent
that these leases only extinguished native title rights and interests if that would have occurred apart
from the NTA (or corresponding State or Territory Acts). For confirmation that this was the intention,
see Senator Harradine's speech, Austl., Commonwealth, Senate, Parliamentary Debates (8 July 1998)
at 5196: "There is the question of extinguishment when rights are determined between pastoral
leaseholders and native title holders or claimants. Of course, in accordance with the Wik decision, the
former takes precedence over the latter. It was proposed in the legislation that those interests be
extinguished. This bill does not extinguish them; it simply suspends them until the lease ceases, runs out. We
have left to the common law the decision as to what occurs then. Hopefully, the common law will
determine that they are to be revived" [emphasis added]. I am grateful to David Yarrow for bringing
the legislative history of Div. 2B and Senator Harradine's speech to my attention.
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acts attributable to the state which denied to the native title holders the continuation of a
traditional right to say who could or who could not come onto the land in question. That
consequence flowed apart from the provisions of the State Validation Act. It followed that to that
extent the grants of pastoral leases extinguished native title rights and interests within the
meaning of para (b)(i) of s 12M(1) [of the Titles (Validation) and Native Title (Effect ofPastActs)
Act 1995 (W.A.), referred to in the judgment as the State Validation Act]. 7
As the provision in the State Validation Act referred to in this passage
replicates (with the substitution of "State" for "Commonwealth") the 1998
amendments to the NTA relating to non-exclusive agricultural and pastoral
leases,' the Court's interpretation of that provision applies equally to the
equivalent provision in the amendments. The majority's conclusion that "[t]hat
consequence flowed apart from the provisions of the State Validation Act"
meant that the "apart from this Act" requirement had been fulfilled, leading
the judges to conclude that the provision in question applied and that native
title rights and interests had been extinguished to the extent of their legal
inconsistency with the rights and interests of the pastoral leaseholders.
Given the wording of this statutory provision and the majority's
application of it, it would be misleading to say that it is the legislation that
brings about partial extinguishment of native title where a non-exclusive
pastoral lease is concerned. In reality, the provision only confirms such
extinguishment if that would have occurred anyway ("apart from this Act"),
either by virtue of the common law or earlier valid statutory authority. The
majority's decision nonetheless gives the impression that partial
extinguishment of native title in this context is due to this provision in the NTA
and the corresponding State and Territory legislation. As mentioned earlier,
the issue of whether a non-exclusive pastoral lease partially extinguished or
merely suspended native title rights and interests had been left open in Wik5
In the appeal from the Federal Court decision in Ward, the Full Court dealt
extensively with this issue, with Justice Beaumont and Justice von Doussa
ruling in favour of partial extinguishment, and Justice North (dissenting in this
regard) opting for suspension.6° But the majority of the High Court begged
this question by declaring that the 1998 amendments to the NTA, together with
5 7 Supra note 48 at 68 [emphasis added].
58 As we have seen, provision for State legislation to this effect was made by the 1998 amendments
to the NTA. See supra note 55.
59 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
60 Western Australia v. Ward (2000), 170 A.L.R. 159. The Full Court held that the Western
Australia State ValidationAct did not apply because it came into force after the hearing at first instance
by the Federal Court, but the High Court overruled this aspect of the Full Court's decision on the
ground that an "appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court is not an appeal in the strict sense":
Ward, supra note 48 at 34. This ruling allowed the High Court to rely on that Act. See text accompanying
supra note 58.
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corresponding State and Territory legislation, "mandate" partial
extinguishment of native title by non-exclusive pastoral leases.6" How can that
be, when the provision in question expressly limits partial extinguishment to
situations where that would have occurred "apart from this Act"? And if the
provision mandated partial extinguishment, why did the majority bother to
conclude that denial of native title rights to control access to the land was a
consequence flowing from the grants of non-exclusive pastoral leases
themselves, rather than from the legislation? 62 There is a logical inconsistency
here, which apparently led the majority-because they regarded the NTA as
mandating the partial extinguishment of native title by non-exclusive pastoral
leases-to think it unnecessary to explain how that extinguishment could have
occurred independently of the Act. By this maneuver, they were able to come
down in favour of partial extinguishment rather than suspension without even
entering into the debate that had been the centre of attention when the case
was before the Full Court.63
Despite what the majority said about the NTA governing the outcome
in the Ward case, it is apparent that the judges were in fact guided by the
extinguishment-by-grant doctrine that had been laid down by Justice Brennan
61 Ward, supra note 48 at 14, 35. The majority did this by deciding, as had the Court in Wik and
the majority of the Full Court in Ward, that the test for inconsistency between the rights and interests
of native titleholders and those of grantees of the Crown is legal, not factual (ibid. at 35-37). If legal
inconsistency were found, the majority of the High Court thought the NTA and corresponding State and
Territory legislation would then apply to mandate extinguishment to the extent of the inconsistency. See
note 63 below.
62 See quotation accompanying Ward, supra note 57. That the majority meant that the grant of
these pastoral leases had extinguished any native title right to control access, independently of the NTA
and State Validation Act, is revealed even more clearly in the part of the judgment dealing with partial
extinguishment in the Northern Territory, where the majority said this: "The [native title] right to be
asked permission to use or have access to the land was inconsistent with the rights asserted under the
various pastoral leases. Therefore, independently of any operation of the Territory Validation Act
[Validation (Native Title) Act 1994 (N.T.)], the consecutive pre-RDA grants of pastoral leases extinguished
this native title right. Paragraph (a) of s 9M(1) [equivalent to s. 12M(1)(b)(i) of the State Validation Act]
of the Territory Validation Act thus was attracted and the relevant native title right extinguished"
(Ward, supra note 48 at 122) [emphasis added]. The confirmatory nature of the statutory provision is
evident in this passage: rights that were previously extinguished are declared by the provision to be
extinguished. See also Anderson, supra note 15 at 351, Kirby J., dissenting.
63 See Ward, supra note 48 at 35, where the majority said: "The NTA, particularly in the distinction
now drawn in s 23A, referred to above, between complete extinguishment and extinguishment 'to the
extent of any inconsitency', mandates the correctness of the approach taken by [the majority of] the Full
Court." However, as we have seen, the general words of s.23A have been restricted by the more specific
wording of s.23G. See supra note 56. Note too that the issue of whether partial extinguishment is
effected by the NTA or caused by the original Crown grant could be of considerable practical importance
for another reason as well, as compensation should be payable if the NTA is responsible for the
extinguishment. See NTA, supra note 49, s.23J, and Callinan J.'s observations in Ward, supra note 48 at
181-82. In Ward, compensation was not a live issue. See the majority judgment at 15. See alsoAnderson,
supra note 15 at 327-28, and note 74 below.
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inMabo and relied upon in subsequent decisions like Wik and Fejo. But what
I find even more troubling about Ward is the way the majority resolved the
partial extinguishment issue without even addressing it. Unfortunately, as this
article has attempted to show, this kind of avoidance of fundamental issues has
been typical of the High Court's approach to extinguishment ever since Mabo.
II. DELGAMUUKWAND OTHER SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS
The history of recognition of Indigenous land rights in Canada has
been very different from the pre-Mabo history of denial in Australia. While
the existence of these rights under the French regime is still a matter of
debate,65 Aboriginal title (as Indigenous title to land is generally called in
Canada) has been acknowledged through Crown practice, including the Royal
Proclamation of 176366 and the Indian treaties.67 Historically, however, this
acknowledgement took place mainly in what are now Ontario and the Prairie
Provinces.68 In British Columbia, apart from the portions of Vancouver Island
that were covered by the Douglas Treaties in the 1850s and the north-eastern
corner of the province that was included in Treaty 8 in 1899 and subsequent
adhesions, the provincial denial of Aboriginal title was not unlike the denial
6 4 See e.g. Ward, supra note 48 at 39: "Reference was made in Mabo [No 2] to the inherent fragility
of native title. One of the principal purposes of the NTA was to provide that native title is not able to be
extinguished contrary to the Act. An important reason to conclude that, before the NTA, native title was
inherently fragile is to be found in this core [Indigenous] concept of a right to be asked permission and
to speak for country. The assertion of sovereignty marked the imposition of a new source of authority
over the land. Upon that authority being exercised, by the creation or assertion of rights to control
access to land, the right to be asked for permission to use or have access to the land was inevitably
confined, if not excluded" [footnote omitted, emphasis added]. Moreover, the majority concluded that
grants of pastoral leases made prior to the RDA, 1975, were valid, no doubt on the basis of Wik. See
supra note 54. The majority judges apparently reached this conclusion because they assumed, as had
the Court in Fejo (see supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text), that the statutory terms "waste lands"
and "Crown lands" included lands subject to native title: Ward, supra note 48 at 57-61, 66. See also
Anderson, supra note 15.
65 See v. C6t9, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 at 168-73.
66 Reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1. For detailed analysis, see Brian Slattery, The Land
Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples (D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1979), reprinted (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979).
67 See e.g. The Hon. Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and
the North-West Territories (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke and Co., 1880).
68 See Peter A. Cumming & Neil H. Mickenberg, eds., Native Rights in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
The Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada, 1972), esp. at 65-132, 171-93.
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that prevailed for so long in Australia.69
It is therefore not surprising that most of the leading cases that have
led to judicial recognition of the concept of Aboriginal title in Canada
originated in British Columbia.7" The most important of these cases is
undoubtedly the Delgamuukw decision," delivered by the Supreme Court of
Canada in 1997. In Delgamuukw the Court defined Aboriginal title for the
first time as a suigeneris form of property that includes a right of exclusive use
and occupation for a variety of purposes that are not limited to the uses that
the Aboriginal titleholders made of their lands in the past.nAs Aboriginal title
is included under the rubric of the "Aboriginal rights" that were "recognized
and affirmed" by section 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982,"3 this means that,
unlike native title in Australia,74 Aboriginal title in Canada is constitutionally
protected against both legislative and executive action, whether federal or
provincial.
Prior to receiving this constitutional protection in 1982, Aboriginal
title would no doubt have been generally subject to federal legislative
infringement and extinguishment, as long as Parliament's intention to infringe
6 9 See Paul Tennant,Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia,
1849-1989 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990).
70See e.g. Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; Guerin v. The Queen,
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. Prior to the Calder decision, the leading case was St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber
Company v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.), a Privy Council decision originating from
Ontario. However, that decision was based more on the Royal Proclamation of 1763 than on Aboriginal
title, in regard to both the source and content of Indigenous land rights. See Kent McNeil, "The
Meaning of Aboriginal Title" in Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on
Law, Equality and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997) 135.
Note too that on 29 April 2004, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in two cases from the
Maritime Provinces involving Aboriginal title: R. v. Bernard, [2003] 4 C.N.L.R. 48 (N.B.C.A.), and R.
v. Marshall, [2004] 1 C.N.L.R. 211 (N.S.C.A.).
71 Supra note 2.
72 Ibid. at 1083, Lamer C.J.C. (Cory and Major JJ. concurring). La Forest J. delivered a separate
judgment for himself and L'Heureux-DubW J., in which they arrived at the same result as the majority
(the case was sent back to trial for application of the principles the Court laid down), but differed
somewhat on the definition of Aboriginal title. McLachlin J., at 1135, concurred with Lamer C.J.C. and
added that she was also in "substantial agreement" with La Forest J.
73 Supra note 3.
74 In Australia, Commonwealth statutes, namely the RacialDiscriminationAct 1975 and the Native
TitleAct 1993, provide native title with some protection against State interference, but this is due to the
division of powers and the paramountcy of Commonwealth laws. In addition, s.51 (xxxi) of theAustralian
Constitution (contained in s.9 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900 (U.K.), 63 & 64
Vict., c.12), provides that any acquisition of private property through Commonwealth legislation has
to be on "just terms," a provision that no doubt applies to native title. See Mabo, supra note 1 at 111,
Deane & Gaudron JJ. But native title is not entrenched in the Constitution in the sense that Aboriginal
title is in Canada.
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or extinguish it was clear and plain.75 While constitutional entrenchment of
Aboriginal rights in 1982 has provided Aboriginal title with protection against
extinguishment, it can still be infringed by or pursuant to federal legislation as
long as the infringement is justified under the Sparrow test (to be discussed
below).7'
Ever since Confederation, however, provincial legislatures have lacked
the constitutional authority to extinguish Aboriginal title, as it comes within the
core of federal jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the
Indians,"'7 and so is protected by the doctrine of intejurisdictional immunity.78
However, for reasons that remain unexplained, the Supreme Court opined in
Delgamuukw that, after Confederation, Aboriginal title could still be infringed
by or pursuant to provincial legislation. Moreover, this provincial authority of
infringement continued even after Aboriginal and treaty rights received
constitutional protection in 1982, subject of course to the requirement that any
such infringement would henceforth have to meet the justification test laid
down in Sparrow.79
Leaving aside the serious division-of-powers problems presented by
provincial authority to infringe Aboriginal title,8" I am going to concentrate on
the Supreme Court's application of the justification test to the general
75 This is due to the general rule of Anglo-Canadian constitutional law, based on parliamentary
sovereignty, that a legislature acting within its constitutional jurisdiction can infringe or extinguish
private rights, including property rights, as long as the intention to do so is unequivocal. See Western
Counties Railway Co. v. Windsor and Annapolis Railway Co. (1882), 7 App. Cas. 178 at 188 (P.C.); and
Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) v. Cannon Brewery Company, Limited, [1919] A.C. 744 at 752
(H.L.), Lord Atkinson. Note, however, that Aboriginal title may have already been protected in some
parts of Canada by constitutional instruments, such as the Rupert's Land and North-Western Territory
Order, 1870, reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 9. See Kent McNeil, Native Claims in Rupert's
Land and the North-Western Territory: Canada's Constitutional Obligations (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1982).
76 In R v. Van derPeet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at 538 [Van der Peet], Lamer C.J.C. said: "Subsequent
to s. 35(1) aboriginal rights cannot be extinguished and can only be regulated or infringed consistent
with the justificatory test laid out by this Court in Sparrow" (supra note 23). See also Delgamuukw, supra
note 2 at 1107-14, Lamer C.J.C.; Mitchell v. M.N.R, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 at 927, McLachlin C.J.C.
[Mitchell].
77 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, s.91(24).
78 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1116-21, Lamer C.J.C.
79 Supra note 23. See Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1107, Lamer C.J.C.
8 0 For detailed discussion of these problems, see Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Division
of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction" (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 431, reprinted in
Emerging Justice?, supra note 5 at 249, and "Aboriginal Title and Section 88 of the Indian Act" (2000)
34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 159; Nigel Bankes, "Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and Provincial Land and
Resource Laws: Some Implications for Provincial Resource Rights" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 317; and
Kerry Wilkins, "Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 185, and "'Still Crazy After All
These Years': Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty" (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 458.
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legislative infringement of Aboriginal title. According to the Sparrow decision,
once Aboriginal people prove a prima facie infringement of an Aboriginal
right (in that case it was a right to fish for food and ceremonial purposes), the
onus is on the Crown to justify the infringement. This involves a two-step
process: first, the Crown has to prove that the infringement is pursuant to a
valid legislative objective; and second, the Crown has to show that it has
respected its fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal people in question. If the
Crown fails to meet either of these requirements, the infringement will be
invalid and the offending legislation will be inapplicable to the extent that it
infringes the Aboriginal right.
Looking at the requirement of a valid legislative objective first, in
Sparrow the Supreme Court found conservation of fish stocks to be a valid
objective because, in the words of Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La Forest,
who wrote the unanimous judgment, it is "aimed at preserving s. 35(1) rights
by conserving and managing a natural resource."8" More generally, the Court
was of the view that "objectives purporting to prevent the exercise of s. 35(1)
rights that would cause harm to the general populace or to aboriginal peoples
themselves, or other objectives found to be compelling and substantial," would
be valid.82 The Court rejected the argument that the "public interest" would
be a sufficient objective, as it is "so vague as to provide no meaningful
guidance and so broad as to be unworkable as a test for the justification of a
limitation on constitutional rights." 3
Turning to the requirement that the Crown's fiduciary obligations to
the Aboriginal peoples be respected, the Court in Sparrow held that this meant
in part that Aboriginal rights, given their constitutional status, have to be given
priority over other rights and interests. In the context of the fishery, this meant
that, after the needs of conservation had been taken into account, the
Aboriginal food fishery had to be given complete priority over commercial and
sports fishing. In practice, the effect of this would be that
[ilf, in a given year, conservation needs required a reduction in the number of fish to be caught
such that the number equalled the number required for food by the Indians, then all the fish
available after conservation would go to the Indians according to the constitutional nature of
their fishing right.'
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The Supreme Court revisited the justification test inR. v. Gladstone."
After deciding that the Heiltsuk Nation had an Aboriginal right to take and
exchange herring spawn on kelp in commercial quantities and that
infringement had been shown, Chief Justice Lamer for the majority examined
the question of how the priority approach taken in Sparrow would apply in the
context of a commercial Aboriginal right. Backpedalling from Sparrow, Chief
Justice Lamer held that priority could not be allocated in the same way in
Gladstone because a right to fish commercially is not restricted by the kind of
inherent limit that is built into a right to fish for food, namely the appetite of
the Aboriginal people in question for fish. As the only limits on a commercial
right to fish are the availability of the resource and the market, Chief Justice
Lamer feared that this right might, in effect, become exclusive.' In his view,
that was not what the Court in Sparrow had in mind when it assigned priority
to an Aboriginal right to fish. So while an Aboriginal right to fish commercially
still has to be given some priority over other commercial and sports fishing, in
allocating the resource after conservation needs have been met the federal
government is entitled to take into account "economic and regional fairness,
and the recognition of the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the
fisheryby non-aboriginal groups."' Chief Justice Lamer regarded concern for
these third party interests as falling within the compelling and substantial
objectives that would meet the first part of the Sparrow justification test
because, "[i]n the right circumstances, such objectives are in the interest of all
Canadians and, more importantly, the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with
the rest of Canadian society may well depend on their successful attainment."'
Chief Justice Lamer's explanation for redefining the priority to be
85 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [Gladstone]. For further insight into this case, see Douglas C. Harris,
"Territoriality, Aboriginal Rights, and the Heiltsuk Spawn-on-Kelp Fishery" (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev.
195.
86 While Lamer C.J.C. might have addressed this concern by limiting the exercise of the right to
the geographical area where the Heiltsuk people traditionally fished, there is no discussion of that
possibility in his judgment. See Harris, ibid. at 229-31. Compare Commonwealth v. Yarmirr (1999), 168
A.L.R. 426 (Full F.C.), where Merkel J., dissenting, envisaged exclusive fisheries in geographically
limited areas of the territorial sea. On appeal, the High Court of Australia dismissed this possibility by
holding that exclusive native title rights in the territorial sea are inconsistent with the public rights of
navigation and fishing, and with the international right of innocent passage: Commonwealth v. Yarmirr
(2001), 184 A.L.R. 113 at 144-45. See also Ward, supra note 48 at 114. For discussion of the relationship
between Aboriginal and public fishing rights, see Mark D. Walters, "Aboriginal Rights, Magna Carta
and Exclusive Rights to Fisheries in the Waters of Upper Canada" (1998) 23 Queen's L.J. 301.
8 7 Gladstone, supra note 85 at 775. See also P, v. Marshall [No. 1], [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, and R v.
Marshall [No. 2], [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, where the Supreme Court took the same kind of approach to a
treaty right to fish for a moderate livelihood (a right that does, however, have an inherent limit).
88 Gladstone, ibid. [emphasis in original].
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accorded to commercial Aboriginal rights sounds suspiciously like the "public
interest" rationale that was rejected in Sparrow.89 As Justice McLachlin (as she
then was) pointed out in her vigorous dissent on this issue of justification in
the Van der Peet case, Chief Justice Lamer's approach "runs counter to the
authorities," and "is indeterminate and ultimately more political than legal."'
In her view, the legislative objectives that the Court in Sparrow regarded as
sufficiently compelling and substantial to justify infringements of Aboriginal
rights were objectives relating to "the responsible exercise of the right," such
as conservation and safety, not things like economic and regional fairness and
the interests of third parties.91 She was also concerned that the Chief Justice's
approach did not respect the Canadian tradition of accommodating
Aboriginal rights through just settlements arrived at by means of negotiated
treaties. Instead, she said that his approach came down to this:
In certain circumstances, aboriginals may be required to share their fishing rights with non-
aboriginals in order to effect a reconciliation of aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests. In other
words, the Crown may convey a portion of an aboriginal fishing right to others, not by treaty or
with the consent of the aboriginal people, but by its own unilateral act. I earlier suggested that
this has the potential to violate the Crown's fiduciary duty to safeguard aboriginal rights and
property. But my concern is more fundamental. How, without amending the Constitution, can
the Crown cut down the aboriginal right? ... To reallocate the benefit of the right from
aboriginals to non-aboriginals would be to diminish the substance of the right that s.35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 guarantees to the aboriginal people. This no court can do.92
Justice McLachlin thus drew a distinction between justifiable
limitations on the exercise of an Aboriginal right and diminution of the right
itself. In property law terms, this is equivalent to the distinction between
regulation and expropriation. The latter need not involve a complete taking,
as even partial appropriation of an owner's rights can amount to
expropriation. 93 We therefore need to ask how Chief Justice Lamer was able
to reconcile his statement in Van der Peet that section 35(1) protects
Aboriginal rights against extinguishment94 with his holding in Gladstone that
an Aboriginal fishing right can be limited by allocation of part of the available
8 9 For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, "How Can Infringements of the Constitutional Rights
of Aboriginal Peoples Be Justified?" Constitutional Forum 8:2 (Winter 1997) 33, reprinted in Emerging
Justice?, supra note 5 at 281.
90 Supra note 76 at 659.
91 Ibid. at 660-61.
92 Ibid. at 667.
93See The Queen (B.C.) v. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533 [Tener], where it was held that preventing
an owner of a profit A prendre from extracting the minerals to which the profit related amounted to a
form of expropriation.
94 See supra note 76.
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resource to third parties. Was he of the view that limiting an Aboriginal fishing
right in this way would not amount to even a partial extinguishment, perhaps
because the limitation could vary from year to year? Or did he think a
complete extinguishment of an Aboriginal right is impermissible, but partial
extinguishment can be justified in appropriate circumstances? His judgment
in Gladstone does not tell us.
It might be argued that the commercial fishing right established in
Gladstone was not proprietary,95 and so the analogy I have drawn between
partial extinguishment of that right and expropriation of property is not
apposite.96 But even assuming this to be so, one cannot distinguish
extinguishment from expropriation in this way where Aboriginal title to land
is concerned. Given that Aboriginal title is proprietary,97 even a partial taking
of it should amount to much the same thing as expropriation.
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer reviewed the articulation of the
justification test in Sparrow and Gladstone, and then explained how the test
would apply in the context of an infringement of Aboriginal title. Referring to
the first part of the test, that is the requirement that the Crown prove a valid
legislative objective, he said that in most cases a valid objective will be one that
"can be traced to the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America
by aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty."9 8 He
elaborated as follows:
In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the
general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the
environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign
populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this
purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of aboriginal title.9
The fact that most of the objectives Chief Justice Lamer listed generally come
within provincial jurisdiction raises a fundamental division-of-powers issue
because Aboriginal title is within the core of federal jurisdiction over "Indians,
and Lands reserved for Indians," and so should be protected from provincial
95 See Sparrow, supra note 23 at 1112, where Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest J. said, in the context
of an Aboriginal right to fish for food, that "[f]ishing rights are not traditional property rights."
96 However, in ibid. at 1119, the Court did envisage the possibility of expropriation of an
Aboriginal right in the context of its discussion of justification for infringement of an Aboriginal right
to fish for food.
97 See text accompanying supra note 72.
98 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1111 [emphasis in original].
99 Ibid.
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infringement by the constitutional doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.00
But leaving that issue aside, let us examine Chief Justice Lamer's list of valid
objectives more closely.
At the risk of stating the obvious, it has to be kept in mind that, in
providing this list, Chief Justice Lamer envisaged a situation where Aboriginal
title had already been established and aprima facie infringement of that title
had been shown.'11 He was therefore addressing the issue of whether the
infringement could be justified. That said, we can divide his objectives into
three categories:
(1) objectives that involve regulation of Aboriginal title for the good of the
Aboriginal peoples themselves and Canadian society generally ("protection
of the environment or endangered species");
(2) objectives that involve expropriation of Aboriginal title, in whole or in part,
for public purposes ("the building of infrastructure", and possibly "the
development of ... hydroelectric power");
(3) objectives that seem to involve the transfer of Aboriginal title, in whole or
in part, from the Aboriginal titleholders toprivate individuals or corporations
("the development of agriculture, forestry, mining ... the general economic
development of the interior of British Columbia ... and the settlement of
foreign [non-Aboriginal?] populations to support those aims").
The first of these categories would appear to encompass the kind of
compelling and substantial objectives that the Court had in mind in Sparrow,
such as conservation. The objectives in the second category closely resemble
the kinds of objectives that allow the Crown to expropriate private property,
though it can only do so if it has unequivocal statutory authority."°2 Moreover,
fair compensation must be paid unless expressly denied by the legislation."
100 See text accompanying supra notes 77-79, and the articles referred to in supra note 80.
101 See text following supra note 80.
102 See Rugby WaterBoard v. Shaw Fox, [1973] A.C. 202 at 214 (H.L.), Lord Pearson; Broom, supra
note 10 at 231; Keith Davies, Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation, 3d ed. (London:
Butterworths, 1978) at 9-10; and Graham L. Fricke, ed., Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Australia,
2d ed. (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1982) at 5-6.
103 See De Keyser's Royal Hotel, supra note 11 at 542, Lord Atkinson; Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The
Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101; Tener, supra note 93 at 547 (Wilson J.), 559 (Estey J.); Rock Resources Inc.
v. British Columbia (2003), 229 D.L.R. (4th) 115 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 8 April
2004. In Sparrow, supra note 23 at 1119, the Court expressed the view that fair compensation would be
payable in the event that an Aboriginal right was expropriated. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at
1113-14, Lamer C.J.C.
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But even more importantly for present purposes, statutory authority of this
kind generally only permits expropriation for public purposes, such as roads
and airports.'0 l am not aware of any expropriation legislation in Canada that
would empower the Crown to take property under the guise of expropriation
for the purpose of transferring it to other persons for a purpose like
agriculture. And yet that is just what Chief Justice Lamer seems to have had
in mind when he included the objectives I have placed in the third category in
his list of potentially valid objectives. He said that the priority accorded to
Aboriginal title in accordance with the Gladstone approach
might entail, for example, that governments accommodate the participation of aboriginal
peoples in the development of the resources of British Columbia, that the conferral of fee
simples for agriculture, and of leases and licences for forestry and mining reflect the prior
occupation of aboriginal title lands, that economic barriers to aboriginal uses of their lands (e.g.,
licensing fees) be somewhat reduced.' °5
So the Chief Justice evidently thought that it could be justifiable for the Crown
to grant fee simple interests in Aboriginal title lands to private persons for
agricultural purposes, or to provide corporations with leases or licences to
exploit the forest and mineral resources on those lands. But if the Aboriginal
peoples wanted to exploit the natural resources on their own lands themselves,
apparently they would have to pay licensing fees, which might be "somewhat
reduced" to encourage economic development.
With all due respect, from a property perspective this aspect of Chief
Justice Lamer's judgment borders on the bizarre. Aboriginal title is not only
a property right that includes the right of exclusive occupation and use-it is
also a constitutionally protected property right!'1" And yet the Crown might be
able to infringe it by granting the land to third parties for agriculture, for
example, because, "in principle," this is a compelling and substantial purpose
that might justify the infringement. Chief Justice Lamer seems to have thought
this could be explained because Aboriginal title is exclusive, and so the
Gladstone approach to priority should apply to it. In other words, because it
is exclusive the priority to be accorded to it is not the Sparrow kind of
104On what constitutes a public purpose, see The King v. O'Halloran, [1934] Ex. C.R. 67; Vaughan
Construction Co. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney-General) (1967), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 692 (N.S. S.C.); Thompson
v. R, [1978] 5 W.W.R. 635 (Man. Q.B.); Pineridge Property Ltd. v. District 57 Board of School Trustees
(1982), 40 B.C.L.R. 221 (Co. Ct.); Grauer Estate v. Canada (1986), 1 F.T.R. 51; and Piccirillo v. British
Columbia (Minister of Forests and Lands) (1988), 47 D.L.R. (4th) 513 (B.C. S.C.).
105 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1112 [emphasis added].
106 For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected
Property Right" in Owen Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: National Implications of the Supreme
Court's Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2000) 55, reprinted in Emerging
Justice?, supra note 5 at 292.
[VOL. 42, NO. 2
The Vulnerability of Indigenous Land Rights
complete priority, but the less generous priority that allowed the Crown in
Gladstone to allocate part of the herring spawn harvest to other users of the
resource.
107
So for Chief Justice Lamer, it seems that Aboriginal title to land can
be equated with the Heiltsuk's Aboriginal right to gather and sell herring
spawn in commercial quantities. But unlike Aboriginal title to land, the
Aboriginal right established in Gladstone does not appear to have amounted
to a property right in the herring spawn itself before it was gathered. Nor was
the right to take it exclusive, in the way that an Aboriginal title right to occupy
and use land is exclusive." If the Gladstone case involved a property interest,
the subject matter of it was a non-exclusive right to take herring spawn in
commercial quantities, not the herring spawn itself. To prevent that right from
being exclusive in practice, Chief Justice Lamer modified the Sparrow
approach to priority so that some of the not-yet-owned herring spawn could
be allocated to other users. By applying the same approach to Aboriginal title
land, Chief Justice Lamer apparently thought it was possible to accord
Aboriginal titleholders exclusive rights to their land, but at the same time
allow infringements that would eliminate that exclusivity by allowing the
Crown to allocate some of their lands or the resources thereon to third parties.
Through this convoluted reasoning, Aboriginal titleholders are enmeshed in
a Catch-22 situation, whereby the very exclusivity of their rights results in
virtually unrestricted Crown authority to infringe their title for objectives that
go beyond regulation and even public purposes to the creation of third party
interests.1t 9
107 In Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1112, Lamer C.J.C. said this: "The exclusive nature of
aboriginal title is relevant to the degree of scrutiny of the infringing measure or action. For example,
if the Crown's fiduciary duty requires that aboriginal title be given priority, then it is the altered
approach to priority that I laid down in Gladstone which should apply."
108 However, in Canada an exclusive fishing right should be possible if geographically limited. See
supra note 86.
109 See Gordon Christie, "Delgamuukw and the Protection of Aboriginal Land Interests" (2000-
2001) 32 Ottawa L. Rev. 85. In practice, the most effective restriction on this power to infringe could
be the obligation to pay compensation. See Sparrow, supra note 23 at 1119, and Delgamuukw, supra note
2 at 1113-14, Lamer C.J.C. The additional requirement that the Crown consult with Aboriginal
titleholders with regard to infringements of their rights could provide some additional protection,
though this "involvement of aboriginal peoples in decisions taken with respect to their lands"
(Delgamuukw, ibid. at 1113) appears rather weak when compared with the kind of protections holders
of non-constitutional real property enjoy against Crown interference. See McNeil, supra note 106. While
the Crown's duties to consult and pay compensation will not be examined further in this article,
additional discussion can be found in Sonia Lawrence & Patrick Macklem, "From Consultation to
Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights and the Crown's Duty to Consult" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 252;
Robert Mainville, An Overview of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights and Compensation for their Breach
(Saskatoon: Purich, 2001); and Albert Peeling, "Delgamuukw and Compensation Issues," on-line:
Delgamuukw Gisday'wa National Process <http://www.delgamuukw.org/research/compensation.htm>.
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Moreover, even if one accepts (which I obviously do not) that
Aboriginal title can be justifiably infringed for the broad range of objectives
that Chief Justice Lamer listed in Delgamuukw, we have seen that property
rights can only be infringed by or pursuant to unequivocal statutory
authority.10 It is not enough, therefore, for the Crown to meet the justification
test for an infringement of Aboriginal title to be valid. As a prerequisite, the
Crown first has to be able to point to a statutory provision authorizing it to
infringe Aboriginal title. Where, one might ask, is the statutory authority
allowing the Crown to take land away from Aboriginal titleholders and grant
it in fee simple to private persons for the purposes of agriculture? Where is the
statutory authority to take away the rights Aboriginal titleholders have to the
forests and minerals on and under their lands,"' and transfer them to third
parties by means of licences or leases? As in Australia, general legislation
authorizing the Crown to grant interests in its own lands should not be
interpreted as empowering the Crown to infringe vested property rights,
including Aboriginal title rights." 2 And specific legislation aimed directly at
Aboriginal title lands would not only be beyond provincial jurisdiction,"3 but
would also be discriminatory."4
To conclude this discussion of the Delgamuukw decision, I think the
Supreme Court's application of the justification test to Aboriginal title suffers
from serious weaknesses. While regulation of Aboriginal title for such purposes
as protection of the environment or endangered species is no doubt within the
compelling and substantial purposes contemplated by the Court in Sparrow,
expropriation of Aboriginal title land for public purposes is another matter. As
Justice McLachlin pointed out in Gladstone, there is a qualitative difference
between infringements that ensure the responsible exercise of a right, and
infringements that reduce or take away the substance of the right. And even
though temporary takings for public purposes might be justifiable in some
instances,"5 such as national emergencies, expropriation amounting to
permanent extinguishment of Aboriginal title would appear to be inconsistent
with Chief Justice Lamer's statement in Van derPeet that "[s]ubsequent to s.
110 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
In Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1084-88, Lamer C.J.C. held that natural resources such as
minerals are included in the content of Aboriginal title.
112 See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
113 See Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1116-19, Lamer C.J.C.
114 See Mabo v. Queensland [No. 1] (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186 (H.C. Aust.); "Racial Discrimination",
supra note 5, esp. at 216-19 (Emerging Justice? at 401-05).
Some expropriation of Aboriginal rights was envisaged in Sparrow, supra note 23 at 1119.
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35(1) aboriginal rights cannot be extinguished."'1 6 Finally, infringement of
Aboriginal title for the purpose of granting interests in lands to third parties
for purposes like agriculture or resource extraction goes even further, as the
benefit of this to the public is at best indirect. From a legal and constitutional
perspective, it is therefore perplexing that the Supreme Court would have
countenanced infringements of this third kind, especially as they seem to
involve at least partial extinguishment of constitutionally protected rights. So
as with the extinguishment-by-grant doctrine created by the High Court in
Mabo, I think one has to look elsewhere for an explanation of the Supreme
Court's approach to justifiable infringement in Delgamuukw.
III. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Judges are obviously very reluctant to base their decisions expressly on
political and economic considerations, as that might place their judicial
objectivity in question and undermine the legitimacy of their judgments. They
therefore attempt to support their decisions with the rhetoric of legal principle
and precedent, as that puts them on more secure ground. But what if the
conclusions they want to reach conflict with well-established authorities that
are fundamental to the common law system? To overrule those authorities
could, in Justice Brennan's words in Mabo, "fracture a skeletal principle of our
legal system."" 7 When faced with this dilemma, judges generally try to
distinguish the situation before them from the context of the principle they
feel obliged to preserve.
In my opinion, the judges in Mabo and Delgamuukw were presented
with just this kind of dilemma. Legal principle and a sense of justice led them
to decide that native or Aboriginal title is a real property interest that is
recognized by the common law. 118 For this, they should be applauded.
However, they were also faced with the reality that all private land rights in
Australia, and most such rights in British Columbia, were created without any
surrender of that title. If the Crown lacked the authority to create valid
interests in lands that were subject to native or Aboriginal title, this could
place these third party interests in jeopardy.
116 Supra note 76 at 538.
1 1 7 Supra note 1 at 43, also at 29. Lamer C.J.C. echoed this in Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1066,
when, quoting Van der Peet, supra note 76 at 550, he said that accommodation of Aboriginal
perspectives "must be done in a manner which does not strain 'the Canadian legal and constitutional
structure."'
118 The justice element is more explicit in Mabo, supra note 1. See esp. at 40-43, Brennan J.; 104-
09, Deane & Gaudron JJ. See also Jeremy Webber, "The Jurisprudence of Regret: The Search for
Standards of Justice in Mabo" (1995) 17 Sydney L. Rev. 5.
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As we have seen, the High Court of Australia's response to this
situation was to create an exception to the well-established common law rule
that the Crown cannot interfere with vested rights to land without unequivocal
statutory authority. 9 That rule, according to the Court, applies only to real
property interests that are themselves derived from a Crown grant." As native
title is not based on a Crown grant, it does not enjoy the protection against
executive action that is accorded to other property interests. In this
questionable way, the High Court was able to achieve its dual goals of
recognizing native title and at the same time maintaining the validity of private
interests in land. But given the weakness of the legal reasoning used to exclude
native title from common law protection against the Crown, I have no doubt
that the Court was motivated by political and economic, rather than legal,
considerations.
The Mabo case itself contains hints to this effect. Justice Brennan, for
example, stated that "[1]and in Australia which has been granted by the Crown
is held on a tenure of some kind and the titles acquired under the accepted land
law cannot be disturbed."12' Even Justice Toohey, whose judgment in Mabo was
perhaps the most favourable to Indigenous Australians, cautioned that
"nothing in this judgment should be taken to suggest that the titles of those to
whom land has been alienated by the Crown may now be disturbed.' ' 22 But
probably the clearest articulation of the political and economic nature of this
aspect of the law of native title in Australia was provided by Justice Kirby in
Fejo: %
In the process of tracing the consequences which flow from Mabo (No. 2), two basic
considerations, at least, restrain the disturbance of interests in land established by the law as
previously understood. The first is that a court should not destroy or contradict an important
and settled principle of the legal system. The second is that, in every society, rights in land which
afford an enforceable entitlement to exclusive possession are basic to socialpeace and the order
as well as to economic investment and prosperity. Any significant disturbance of such established
rights is therefore, ordinarily, a matter for the legislature not the courts.'2
So the High Court was willing to reassess the law to make room for the
concept of native title because that would not upset any settled principles of
See supra notes 7-47 and accompanying text.
120 One might ask whether this means that the decision in Perry v. Clissold, supra note 22, where
the Privy Council held that the Crown had to respect the possessory title of an adverse possessor who
obviously was not relying on a Crown grant, has been overruled in Australia.
121 Mabo, supra note 1 at 47 [emphasis added].
122 Ibid. at 196.
1 23 Supra note 35 at 150 [footnotes omitted, emphasis added]. See also Ward, supra note 48 at 148-
49 (McHugh J., dissenting), 279-81 (Callinan J., dissenting).
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the common law system.124 But it was not willing to disturb the status quo by
undermining the validity of non-Indigenous property rights in Australia, even
though this meant according those rights precedence over the land rights of
Indigenous Australians for no good doctrinal reason."z
In Canada, the Supreme Court has not yet had to face this conflict
between the land rights of the Aboriginal peoples and third party interests
directly." However, we have seen that inDelgamuukw the Court has prepared
the way for giving precedence to private interests by providing the Crown with
broad powers to infringe Aboriginal title, even for such purposes as
agriculture, forestry, and mining.' 27 It has done this in spite of the fact that
Aboriginal title should enjoy not only the protection against executive
interference that the common law has traditionally accorded to property
rights, but also the additional protection against legislative interference that has
been its due as a constitutionally entrenched Aboriginal right since 1982.
The political and economic nature of the justification test for
infringements of Aboriginal rights, as articulated by Chief Justice Lamer in
Gladstone, was clearly recognized by Justice McLachlin in her dissent in Van
der Peet. As we have seen, she said that the Chief Justice had made the
concept of infringement "more political than legal" by adding economic and
regional fairness and third party interests to the acceptable legislative
objectives that could justify infringements of Aboriginal rights.1 While
agreeing with Chief Justice Lamer that reconciliation between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal communities is "a goal of fundamental importance," Justice
McLachlin said this:
The question is how this reconciliation of the different legal cultures of aboriginal and non-
aboriginal peoples is to be accomplished. More particularly, does the goal of reconciliation of
aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests require that we permit the Crown to require a judicially
authorized transfer of the aboriginal right to non-aboriginals without the consent of the
124 In fact, this brought Australian law more into line with established common law principles. See
works cited supra note 6.
125 The political nature of this compromise is revealed as well in the debate over the Native Title
Act 1993 (Cth.) and the decision, supported by Indigenous leaders, to provide legislative validation to
Crown grants issued between enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.) and the Native
TitleAct that might otherwise be invalid. See Tim Rowse, "How We Got a Native Title Act" in Murray
Goot & Tim Rowse, eds., Make a Better Offer: The Politics ofMabo (Leichhardt, N.S.W.: Pluto Press,
1994) 111; McRae et al., supra note 4 at 247-52; and Noel Pearson, "Land Is Susceptible of Ownership"
(10 October 2003) at 34, online: Cape York Partnerships <http://www.capeyorkpartnerships.com/
noelpearson/NPlandSUSCEPTIBLE2003.doc>.
126 The Court avoided the issue recently when it refused leave to appeal the Ontario Court of
Appeal's decision in Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 2.
127 See text accompanying supra notes 99 and 105.
128 Van der Peet, supra note 76 at 659. See text accompanying supra notes 90-92.
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aboriginal people, without treaty, and without compensation? I cannot think it does.'2
Reconciliation figured prominently in Chief Justice Lamer's discussion
ofjustifiable infringement of Aboriginal title inDelgamuukw. As we have seen,
he preceded his list of valid legislative objectives for infringement with the
statement that "[m]ost of these objectives can be traced to the reconciliation
of the prior occupation of North America by aboriginal peoples with the
assertion of Crown sovereignty". 3 0 But as Justice McLachlin made clear in her
dissent in Van der Peet, what reconciliation really involves in this context is a
transfer of the substance of Aboriginal rights to non-Aboriginal persons in the
interest of "societal peace.""' With respect, I agree entirely with Justice




The lesson to be learned from the decisions examined in this article
can, I think, be summed up like this: regardless of the strengths of legal
arguments in favour of Indigenous peoples, there are limits to how far the
courts in Australia and Canada are willing to go to correct the injustices
caused by colonialism and dispossession. Despite what judges may say about
maintaining legal principle, at the end of the day what really seems to
determine the outcome in these kinds of cases is the extent to which
Indigenous rights can be reconciled with the history of British settlement
129 Van der Pee, ibid. at 664. For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, "Reconciliation and the
SupremeCourt:TheOpposingViewsofChiefJusticesLamerandMcLachlin"(2003)21ndigenousL.J. 1.
130 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1111 [emphasis in original]. See text accompanying supra notes
98-99.
131 Supra note 76 at 668 (McLachlin J., however, concurred with Lamer C.J.C. in Delgamuukw,
raising the question of whether she has given in to the majority on this point. For discussion, see
McNeil, supra note 129). It is noteworthy that Kirby J. also referred to the need to maintain "social
peace" in Fejo. See quotation accompanyingsupra note 123. See also the quotation from Lamer C.J.C.'s
judgment in Gladstone accompanying supra note 88.
132 For further insight into the political nature of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
Aboriginal rights, see John Borrows, "Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the
Trickster" (1997) 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 37, and "Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537; Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood
Henderson, "The Supreme Court's Van derPeet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand" (1997)
42 McGill L.J. 993; Patricia A. Montuire-Angus, Journeying Forward: Dreaming First Nation's
Independence (Halifax: Fernwood, 1999); and Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the
Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
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without disturbing the current political and economic power structure.1 33 I
think this is a reality that Indigenous peoples need to take into account when
deciding whether courts are the best places to obtain redress for historical
wrongs and recognition of present-day rights. It may be advantageous to
formulate strategic approaches that avoid surrendering too much power to the
judicial branch of the Australian and Canadian state.
133 For a recent example in relation to political power, see Binnie J.'s judgment in Mitchell, supra
note 76. See also Peter H. Russell, "High Courts and the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples: The Limits of
Judicial Independence" (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 247.
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